

FS20

APPLICATION PROTOCOLS

DNS, HTTP, RPC

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Agenda

- **Distributed Systems in the News**
- **RPC / binary protocols**
- **HTTP / text protocols**
- **DNS (protocol and distributed system)**

■ 13.02.2020: Internet's safe-keepers forced to postpone crucial DNSSEC root key signing ceremony – no, not a hacker attack, but because they can't open a safe

- 40th Root Key Signing Key Ceremony postponed, [notarization, legal representation, witnesses](#)
- quarterly ceremony since [2010](#)
- [15.02.2020](#): “We have successfully opened the safe”
- Key signing ceremony: [online](#), [next 23.4.2020](#)

■ 01.03.2020: [Pingdom](#) Website Speed Test


- Test dsl.hsr.ch from San Francisco: >1sec for first byte

■ 24.02.2020: Berners-Lee's Solid project: Schneier joins team to give you back control over data

■ [People behind Solid/Inrupt](#)

- Tim Berners Lee (creator of www)
- Bruce Schneier (security researcher, writer)
- “Solid is the technically potent, open-source platform built to decentralize the web”
- Decentralized infrastructure: manage your data in Pods. You own the data, and give permission who can access it
 - Linked/structured data
 - [Solid React applications](#)
 - [Web Access Control and Linked Data Platform](#)

Challenge Task FS 2020



FS20

Important dates

- Check <https://dsl.hsr.ch/lect/>
 - See if your name is there
- Today's lecture is about text/binary protocols

- Lecture dates 17.02.2020 - 29.05.2020
- Exam sessions 10.08.2020 - 11.09.2020

Verteilte SW-Systeme (VSS)

Nr	Date Lecture	Date Exercise	Topics	Slides	Milestones
01	18.02.2020	-	Admin, Introduction	VSS-FS20-01-Admin_v1.pdf , VSS-FS20-01-Introduction_v2.pdf , alpine-fs20_v3.ova (VirtualBox Image - root/hsr12345 (47MB))	Group forming idea for services
02	25.02.2020	25/26.02.2020	Protocols, Basics, Scalability	VSS-FS20-02-Proto_v3.pdf	Setup dev environment
03	03.03.2020	03/04.03.2020	Application Protocols	VSS-FS20-03-App-proto_v1.pdf	Information flow
04	10.03.2020	10/11.03.2020	Deployment, Infrastructure		Load balancer
05	17.03.2020	17/18.03.2020	RPC and Queues		Authentication

■ DDoS - Amplification Attacks

■ Protocols, lecture 2: layer 4

- TCP, UDP, (QUIC)

■ Designing custom protocols (e.g. Kafka, [atp-go](#))

- Needs more time to develop / test
- + Can be more efficient (space/performance)

■ Protocol generators (binary): Thrift / Avro / Protocol Buffers / (ASN1)

- + IDL (interface description language) generates code
- + Standard
- Has more overhead

e.g, Avro IDL - higher-level language for authoring Avro schemata → generates Avro schema

```
//Avro IDL
@namespace("ch.hsr.dsl")

protocol MyProtocol{
  record AMessage {
    string request;
    int code;
  }
  record BMessage {
    string reply;
  }

  BMessage GetMessage(AMessage msg);
}

{"namespace": "ch.hsr.dsl",
 "type": "record",  "name":
"AMessage",
 "fields": [
  {"name": "request", "type":
"string"},
  {"name": "code", "type": "int"}
]
}
```

■ Custom encoding/decoding

- You control every aspect
- You spend more time on it


■ Little-endian / Big-endian

- sequential order where bytes are converted into numbers

■ Networking, e.g. TCP headers: Big-endian

■ Most CPUs e.g., x86: Little-endian

```
115 public static boolean decodeHeader(final ByteBuffer buffer, final InetSocketAddress recipientSocket,
116                                   final InetSocketAddress senderSocket, final Message message) {
117     LOG.debug("Decode message. Recipient: {}, Sender:{}", recipientSocket, senderSocket);
118     final int versionAndType = buffer.readInt();
119     message.version(versionAndType >>> 4);
120     message.type(Type.values()[versionAndType & Utils.MASK_0F]);
121     message.protocolType(ProtocolType.values()[versionAndType >>> 30]);
122     message.messageId(buffer.readInt());
123     final int command = buffer.readUnsignedByte();
124     message.command((byte) command);
125     final Number160 recipientID = Number160.decode(buffer);
126
127     //we only get the id for the recipient, the rest we already know
128     final PeerAddress recipient = PeerAddress.builder().peerId(recipientID).build();
129     message.recipient(recipient);
130
131
132     final int contentType = buffer.readInt();
133     message.hasContent(contentType != 0);
134     message.contentTypes(decodeContentTypes(contentType, message));
```



Protocols Examples with Golang

■ UDP example in repo [VSS-RPC](#)

- Why is it failing?

```
func main() {
    fmt.Println("connecting...")
    conn, _ := net.Dial("udp", "127.0.0.1:7000")
    defer conn.Close()
    buf := make([]byte, 4)
    binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(buf, 77)
    conn.Write(buf)
}

func main() {
    fmt.Println("listening...")
    inet := &net.UDPAddr{net.IPv4zero, 7000, ""}
    udpConn, _ := net.ListenUDP("udp", inet)
    b := make([]byte, 4)
    n, b2, _ := udpConn.ReadFromUDP(b);
    fmt.Printf("connecting... read: %d, addr: %v, data: %v," +
        " decoded: %v\n", n, b2, b[:n], binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b))
}
```

■ TCP

- Custom serialization 5,Anybody there?
 - 15 bytes

```
func main() {
    fmt.Println("connecting...")
    conn, _ := net.Dial("tcp", "127.0.0.1:7000")
    defer conn.Close()
    buf := make([]byte, 15)
    buf[0]=5
    copy(buf[1:], []byte("Anybody there?"))
    _, _ = conn.Write(buf)
}

func main() {
    fmt.Println("listening...")
    tcpConn, _ := net.Listen("tcp", ":7000")
    conn, _ := tcpConn.Accept() //do this in a go routine
    b := make([]byte, 15)
    n, _ := conn.Read(b)
    fmt.Printf("connecting... read: %d, addr: %v, data: [% x], decoded: %v\n",
        n, conn.RemoteAddr(), b[:n], string(b[1:]))
}
```

30 13 02 01 05 16 0e 41 6e 79 62 6f 64 79 20 74 68 65 72 65 3f

■ ASN1

- Defined in 1984. Standard interface description language (IDL)
- Define data structures - can be serialized and deserialized
- Used e.g., in: X.509 (hsr.ch)
- Generic binary protocol, [Golang package](#)
- Example: 21 bytes, XML: 48 bytes

```
type TestASN struct {  
    Code *big.Int  
    Message string  
}  
...  
func main() {  
    ...  
    var t TestASN  
    _, err = asn1.Unmarshal(b, &t)  
}
```

30 – type tag indicating SEQUENCE
13 – length in octets of value that follows
02 – type tag indicating INTEGER
01 – length in octets of value that follows
05 – value (5)
16 – type tag indicating IA5String
(IA5 means the full 7-bit ISO 646 set, including variants,
but is generally US-ASCII)
0e – length in octets of value that follows
41 6e 79 62 6f 64 79 20 74 68 65 72 65 3f – value
("Anybody there?")

```
<code>5</code>  
<message>Anybody there?</message>
```

URL: b.socrative.com/student/

Room: HSR

Protocols Example Avro

■ Avro: data serialization system

- Remote procedure call and data serialization framework
- Use: Hadoop (Big-data framework)

■ LinkedIn go-avro library

- Define a message in JSON ([benchmarks](#)) or IDL (slide 12) – no code generation

```
func main() {
    schema, _ := ioutil.ReadFile("schema.avsc")
    codec, _ := goavro.NewCodec(string(schema))
    map1 := map[string]interface{}{
        "request": "Anybody there?",
        "code": 5,
    }
    binary, _ := codec.BinaryFromNative(nil, map1)
    conn, _ := net.Dial("tcp", "127.0.0.1:7000")
    defer conn.Close()
    n, _ := conn.Write(binary)
    fmt.Printf("wrote %d bytes: [% x]\n", n, binary)
}
```

■ Server

- Example 16 bytes, assuming both have the same IDL

```
{"namespace": "ch.hsr.dsl",
 "type": "record", "name": "AMessage",
 "fields": [
     {"name": "request", "type": "string"},
     {"name": "code", "type": "int"}
 ]
}
```

```
func main() {
    schema, _ := ioutil.ReadFile("schema.avsc")
    codec, _ := goavro.NewCodec(string(schema))
    tcpConn, _ := net.Listen("tcp", ":7000")
    conn, _ := tcpConn.Accept() //do this in a go routine
    binary := make([]byte, 100)
    n, _ := conn.Read(binary)
    native, _, _ := codec.NativeFromBinary(binary[:n])
    fmt.Printf("read: %v\n", native)
}
```

Protocol Buffers Example

- **Protobuf**: data serialization system from Google ([2.3.2020 – new Go API](#))
 - Design goals: smaller and faster than XML
 - Use: nearly all inter-machine communication at Google
- **Generate 1 go file**
 - `protoc schema.proto --go_out go-gen2`
 - integers to identify fields. Protocol buffer contains only numbers, not field names


■ 18 bytes

```
m := &pb.AMessage{Id: 5, Message: "Anybody there?"}
out, err := proto.Marshal(m)

m := &pb.AMessage{}
if err := proto.Unmarshal(binary[:n], m); err != nil {
    panic(err)
}
```

- Not self-describing, but has gzipped description

```
syntax = "proto3";
message AMessage {
    int32 id = 1;
    string message = 2;
}
```



Plugins supporting *.thrift files found.

[Install plugins](#)

[Ignore extension](#)



■ RPC Framework from Facebook

- IDL and binary protocol
- For building cross-platform application in ActionScript, C, C++, C#, Cappuccino, Cocoa, Delphi, Erlang, Go, Haskell, Java, Node.js, Objective-C, OCaml, Perl, PHP, Python, Ruby, Rust, Smalltalk, and Swift

■ Installation

- `sudo apt install thrift-compiler`
- `thrift -r --gen go schema.thrift`
- Creates go files (client)

```
service TestService {  
    void AMessage(1:i32 int, 2:string message)  
}
```

■ Example generic server

- `go run simple-gen-srv.go`
- `go run simple-thrift.go -p 7000`
- `go run simple-thrift.go -p 7000 AMessage 5 'Anybody there?'`

■ 49 bytes transferred

■ Thrift also encodes which function to call, larger size

■ gRPC

- Uses [HTTP/2](#) for transport
- Uses Protocol Buffers as IDL
- Features: authentication, bidirectional streaming and flow control, blocking or nonblocking bindings, and cancellation and timeouts, many [languages](#)
- Installation
 - `go get -u google.golang.org/grpc`
 - `go get -u github.com/golang/protobuf/protoc-gen-go`
 - `protoc schema-grpc.proto --go_out=plugins=grpc:go-gen3`
- 198 / 135 (wireshark)

```
grpcServer := grpc.NewServer()
s := Server{}
schemagrpc.RegisterMessageServiceServer(grpcServer, &s)
grpcServer.Serve(tcpConn)
```

■ Define services and message

- Generate 1 source file with functions (service)

```
syntax = "proto3";

service MessageService {
    rpc SendMessage (AMessage) returns (Empty);
}

message AMessage {
    int32 code = 1;
    string message = 2;
}

message Empty {}

var conn *grpc.ClientConn
conn, _ := grpc.Dial(":7000", grpc.WithInsecure())
if err != nil {
    log.Fatalf("did not connect: %s", err)
}
defer conn.Close()
c := schema_grpc.NewMessageServiceClient(conn)
response, _ := c.SendMessage(context.Background(),
    &schema_grpc.AMessage{Code:5,Message:"Anybody there?"})
```

JSON example

■ JSON + REST

- Human-readable text to transmit data
- Often used for web apps

■ 187 bytes

```
func main() {  
    fmt.Println("Connecting...")  
    req, _ := http.NewRequest("POST", "http://localhost:7000",  
        strings.NewReader(`{"code": 5,"message": "Anybody there?"}`))  
    req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")  
    client := &http.Client{}  
    resp, err := client.Do(req)  
    if err != nil {  
        panic(err)  
    }  
    defer resp.Body.Close()  
    fmt.Printf("wrote request")  
}
```

■ Parsing overhead, JSON slower than binary protocol - [benchmarks](#)

```
[  
    {  
        "id": "bitcoin",  
        "name": "Bitcoin",  
        "symbol": "BTC",  
        "rank": "1",  
        "price_usd": "9324.08",  
        "price_btc": "1.0",  
        "24h_volume_usd": "9039300000.0",  
        "market_cap_usd": "158560288125",  
        "available_supply": "17005462.0",  
        "total_supply": "17005462.0",  
        "max_supply": "21000000.0",  
        "percent_change_1h": "0.46",  
        "percent_change_24h": "-0.27",  
        "percent_change_7d": "4.5",  
        "last_updated": "1525011874"  
    }, ...  
]
```

Protocols Bencoding and Others

■ Bencoding

- Integers: i42e
- Byte string: 4:test
- List: l4:testi42ee
- Map/dictionary: d4:test3:hsr3:tomi42ee

■ Use: BitTorrent

■ Cap'n Proto, FlatBuffers


- Do not serialize, just copy, little-endian

■ Apache Arrow

- Do not serialize, copy, and optimally layout for memory access

■ ... and many others

■ Benchmarks, benchmarks, benchmarks



ubuntu-18.04-desktop-amd64.iso.torrent - GHex

File Edit View Windows Help

00000000 64 38 3A 61 6E 6E 6F 75 6E 63 65 33 39 3A 68 74 d8:announce39:ht
00000010 74 70 3A 2F 2F 74 6F 72 72 65 6E 74 2E 75 62 75 tp://torrent.ubu
00000020 6E 74 75 2E 63 6F 6D 3A 36 39 36 39 2F 61 6E 6E ntu.com:6969/ann
00000030 6F 75 6E 63 65 31 33 3A 61 6E 6E 6F 75 6E 63 65 ouncement13:announce
00000040 2D 6C 69 73 74 6C 6C 33 39 3A 68 74 74 70 3A 2F -list139:http:/
00000050 2F 74 6F 72 72 65 6E 74 2E 75 62 75 6E 74 75 2E /torrent.ubuntu.
00000060 63 6F 6D 3A 36 39 36 39 2F 61 6E 6E 6F 75 6E 63 com:6969/announc
00000070 65 6C 34 34 3A 68 74 74 70 3A 2F 2F 69 70 76 eel44:http://ip
00000080 36 2E 74 6F 72 72 65 6E 74 2E 75 62 75 6E 74 75 6.torrent.ubuntu
00000090 2E 63 6F 6D 3A 36 39 36 39 2F 61 6E 6E 6F 75 6E .com:6969/announ
000000A0 63 65 65 65 37 3A 63 6F 6D 6D 65 6E 74 32 39 3A cee7:comment29:
000000B0 55 62 75 6E 74 75 20 43 44 20 72 65 6C 65 61 73 Ubuntu CD releas
000000C0 65 73 2E 75 62 75 6E 74 75 2E 63 6F 6D 31 33 3A es.ubuntu.com13:
000000D0 63 72 65 61 74 69 6F 6E 20 64 61 74 65 69 31 35 creation datei15
000000E0 32 34 37 37 36 33 30 38 65 34 3A 69 6E 66 6F 64 24776308e4:infod
000000F0 36 3A 6C 65 6E 67 74 68 69 31 39 32 31 38 34 33 6:lengthi1921843
00000100 32 30 30 65 34 3A 6E 61 6D 65 33 30 3A 75 62 75 200e4:name30:ubu
00000110 6E 74 75 2D 31 38 2E 30 34 2D 64 65 73 6B 74 6F ntu-18.04-deskto
00000120 70 2D 61 6D 64 36 34 2E 69 73 6F 31 32 3A 70 69 p-amd64.iso12:pi
00000130 65 63 65 20 6C 65 6E 67 74 68 69 35 32 34 32 38 ece lengthi52428

Signed 8 bit:	100	Signed 32 bit:	1631205476	Hexadecimal:	64
Unsigned 8 bit:	100	Unsigned 32 bit:	1631205476	Octal:	144
Signed 16 bit:	14436	Signed 64 bit:	1631205476	Binary:	01100100
Unsigned 16 bit:	14436	Unsigned 64 bit:	1631205476	Stream Length:	8 - +
Float 32 bit:	2.146974e+20	Float 64 bit:	4.719431e+257		

☒ Show little endian decoding ☐ Show unsigned and float as hexadecimal


Offset: 0x0

URL: b.socrative.com/student/

Room: HSR

Application Protocol: HTTP

- **HTTP (HyperText Transfer Protocol):**
foundation of data communication for www
- **Started in 1989 by Tim Berners-Lee**
 - HTTP/1.1 published in 1997
 - HTTP/2 published in 2015
 - More efficient, header compression, multiplexing
- **Request / response (resource)**
- **HTTP resources identified by URL**
 - `https://dsl.hsr.ch/design/hsr_logo.svg`



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypertext_Transfer_Protocol

■ Text-based protocol

```
openssl s_client -connect dsl.hsr.ch:443
... TLS handshake ...
GET /
```

■ Browser sends a bit more...

▼ Request Headers (359 B)

```
Host: dsl.hsr.ch
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:73.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/73.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
DNT: 1
Connection: keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Cache-Control: max-age=0
TE: Trailers
```

■ Response

■ Header

▼ Response Headers (227 B)

```
HTTP/2 200 OK
server: cloudflare-nginx
content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
date: Mon, 02 Mar 2020 14:29:39 GMT
x-page-speed: 1.13.35.2-0
cache-control: max-age=0, no-cache
content-encoding: gzip
X-Firefox-Spdy: h2
```

■ Status Code: 200

- [List](#): from 1xx (information response), 2xx (success) – 200 OK, 3xx (redirection), 4xx (client error), 404 Not Found, 403 Forbidden (access slides outside HSR), 5xx (server errors)

■ Content

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
  <title>Distributed Systems and Ledgers Lab</title>
  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="design/layout.css"/>
  ...
```

■ HTTP is a stateless protocol

- Server maintains no state

■ [Request methods](#): GET, HEAD, POST, PUT, DELETE, TRACE, OPTIONS, CONNECT, PATCH

■ Web server [one-liner](#) - with netcat:

- while true; do { echo -e 'HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\n Hallo'; } | nc -l 8080 -q 1; done

■ Every Webbrowser has dev tools to show request / responses


- Firefox, Chrome: ctrl+shift+i / F12
- Used regularly

URL: b.socrative.com/student/

Room: HSR

Application Protocol: DNS

- Translates human readable domain names to IP addresses “phonebook of the Internet”
 - Delegate authority over sub-domains to other name servers
- Lots of new TLD: .zuerich, .bmw, .americanexpress, .youtube, .
 - No special characters: ASCII (no UTF)
 - Punycode: bücher.tld → xn--bcher-kva.tld
- Hierarchical and decentralized naming system for computers
 - E.g., dsl.hsr.ch
 - Uses UDP, port 53
 - Designed in 1983: unencrypted, unsigned
- Before DNS: exchange of hosts.txt
 - Does not scale



Application Protocol: DNS

■ Primary + secondary DNS in case of failure

- Secondary DNS gets data from primary

■ Typical setup


- User
- Caching/forwarding DNS (e.g., [dnsmasq](#))
- Recursive servers: DNS name resolution for applications (e.g., [bind/unbound](#))
- Authoritative servers: providing a definitive answer of e.g., tomp2p.net (e.g., [bind/nsd](#))
 - Authoritative DNS service allows **others** to find **your** domain; Recursive DNS allows **you** to resolve **other** domains

■ Restriction to 13 root servers due to 512 byte packet limit

- With anycast, ~600 root servers around the world

E.g. [BIND](#)

```
zone tomp2p.net {  
    type master;  
    file "zones/tomp2p.net";  
    allow-transfer { 192.168.0.3; };  
};
```



Application Protocol: DNS

- **l.root-servers.net** , 1 root IP with anycast mirrored in 128 locations
- **2015: Internet DNS servers withstand huge DDoS attack**
 - 5m requests/s – some DNS could handle it
- Root zone is controlled by the United States Department of Commerce , operations by ICANN
- Root zone file: [download](#)

HOSTNAME	IP ADDRESSES	MANAGER
a.root-servers.net	198.41.0.4, 2001:503:ba3e::2:30	VeriSign, Inc.
b.root-servers.net	199.9.14.201, 2001:500:200::b	University of Southern California (ISI)
c.root-servers.net	192.33.4.12, 2001:500:2::c	Cogent Communications
d.root-servers.net	199.7.91.13, 2001:500:2d::d	University of Maryland
e.root-servers.net	192.203.230.10, 2001:500:a8::e	NASA (Ames Research Center)
f.root-servers.net	192.5.5.241, 2001:500:2f::f	Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.
g.root-servers.net	192.112.36.4, 2001:500:12::d0d	US Department of Defense (NIC)
h.root-servers.net	198.97.190.53, 2001:500:1::53	US Army (Research Lab)
i.root-servers.net	192.36.148.17, 2001:7fe::53	Netnod
j.root-servers.net	192.58.128.30, 2001:503:c27::2:30	VeriSign, Inc.
k.root-servers.net	193.0.14.129, 2001:7fd::1	RIPE NCC
l.root-servers.net	199.7.83.42, 2001:500:9f::42	ICANN
m.root-servers.net	202.12.27.33, 2001:dc3::35	WIDE Project

<https://www.iana.org/domains/root/se>



Many of the locations of L.ROOT-SERVERS.ORG instances.
Map courtesy of ICANN, operators of "L".

■ DNS structure

- TTL defines the duration in seconds that the record may be cached by any resolver. “0” means no cache. Recommendation: > 1d

■ Type of records

- [SOA](#) - Start of Authority record: serial number and different caching times for 2nd DNS, emails (no @). Last time (3H) is for negative caching
- [NS](#) - Name Server Record – sets the authoritative name server for this zone. 2 NS records – [round robin](#)! more sophisticated LB: [split horizon](#)
- [MX](#) - name and relative preference of mail servers
- [A/AAAA](#) - IPv4/IPv6 Address Record
- [TXT](#) - arbitrary and unformatted text
- [PTR](#) - opposite of A /AAAA

```
$TTL 3D
$ORIGIN tomp2p.net.
@ SOA ns.noep.ch. root.noep.ch. (2018030404 8H 2H 4W 3H)
                                NS      ns.noep.ch.
                                NS      ns.jos.li.
                                MX       10    mail.noep.ch.
                                A         188.40.119.115
                                TXT       "v=spf1 mx -all"
www                             A         188.40.119.115
bootstrap                       A         188.40.119.115
$INCLUDE "/etc/openssl/keys/mail.txt"
$INCLUDE "/etc/bind/dmarc.txt"
```

```
dig dsl.hsr.ch
dig -x 152.96.80.48
dig mx tomp2p.net
dig tomp2p.net @ns.noep.ch
```

■ Lets add dsl.tomp2p.net!

■ To run your own DynDNS service: TSIG


- Enables DNS queries to authenticate updates to a DNS database
- Uses shared secret and cryptographic hashing for authentication

■ DNSSEC (security extension)

- Authenticated and data integrity, **not** confidentiality
- Can be used to bootstrap other security systems
 - Certificates, SSH fingerprints, IPsec pub keys
- KSK: key signing keys to sign other DNSKEY records
- ZSK: zone signing keys to sign records
 - Example: `dig DNSKEY tomp2p.net`


■ New record types: RRSIG, DNSKEY, DS, ...

- RRSIG, sign all resource sets



- ZSK used to sign RRset
 - How to validate ZSK?
- KSK used to sign ZSK pub key
 - With 2 keys, its easier to change ZSK
- We now know that entries are signed. KSK signs ZSK, ZSK signs Rrset
 - `dig any tomp2p.net`
- DS (delegation signer) record in the parent zone

Application Protocol: DNS




■ 25.02.2020: The Facts: Mozilla's DNS over HTTPS (DoH)


- DNS is unencrypted → DNSSEC signs but does not encrypt
- DNS war
 - DNS over TLS (DoT) vs. DNS over HTTPS (DoH)
- Mozilla: “Today in practice, DNS is centralized because consumer devices are locked to the DNS service of ISPs”
- Very controversial topic:
 - Argument: 5 ISPs per country, this is centralized, DoH with cloudflare is less centralized?
 - Application manages DNS, different result for different applications, but possible to query DNS from Javascript
 - <https://ungleich.ch/en-us/cms/blog/2019/09/11/turn-off-doh-firefox/>
 - [Google](#): wont override choice of DNS provider

Application Protocol: DNS

■ DNS




■ DNSSEC




Application Protocol: DNS

■ DoT (assuming DNSSEC)



■ DoH (assuming DNSSEC)



The DNS war

DoH

- provides confidentiality of lookups in transit
- Uses standard HTTP/2, on the standard port (443)
 - Cannot distinguish between traffic/DNS
- Trivially deployed , DNS response are served like simple web pages
- Performance: TCP+TLS handshake → 2/3 RTT
 - But: Cloudflare is close to you
- Difficult upgrade path for clients: per-application installation
- Browsers can perform DNS queries using Javascript

DoT

- provides confidentiality of lookups in transit
- DNS over TLS, separate port (853)
 - Can be blocked
- Widely supported by serving software (Bind, PowerDNS, Unbound) and public resolvers (Cloudflare, Quad9, Google)
- Performance: TCP+TLS handshake → 2/3 RTT
 - But: ISP is close to you
- Easy upgrade path for clients: clients can test if the configured resolver supports DoT on port 853, fall back to DoU53 otherwise)

URL: b.socrative.com/student/

Room: HSR

Questions?



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